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Effects of Government Housing 






Property rights are widely imagined to have considerable direct and indirect 
effects on urban poverty. Evidence is however scarce, more so in Southern 
Africa. This paper examines the effects of property rights in South Africa 
through a case-study of subsidised privately-titled housing for poor people in 
Khayelitsha, Cape Town using a difference-in-differences estimation strategy. 
The results show that housing subsidies are associated with better physical 
health and (counter-intuitively) higher occurrence of teenage pregnancy. 
Improvement in health is attributed to better housing quality and environment. 
The effects of titling extend to human capital, which is understudied in the 
literature. Scholars thus need to go beyond examining economic effects alone. 
Since titling showed no effect by most measures, it is likely that poverty is 
driven so strongly by factors such as unemployment that property rights make 





Titling has been advanced as a solution to urban poverty (De Soto, 2000; 
Leckie, 2004; Durand-Lasserve and Selod, 2009: 110-111). Titling may be 
defined as the process of integrating informal tenure into a system recognised 
by public authorities through the delivery of real property rights authenticated 
and guaranteed by the state through freehold and leasehold title deeds (Durand-
Lasserve and Selod, 2009: 105). Titling has been favoured over the 
administrative recognition of occupancy. Administrative recognition of 
occupancy is a process of delivery of temporary rights in which building is 
conditional on standards set by authorities (Durand-Lasserve and Selod, 2009: 
10). 
 
Despite the promotion of titling, the state of empirical knowledge of the effects 
on individuals, households and communities in developing countries is scarce 
(Durand-Lasserve and Selod, 2009: 115). In Southern Africa particularly, very 
few evaluations have been carried out despite the existence of titling 
programmes. Studies on the effects of titling on social and human capital are 




labour participation and access to credit. In addition, some scholars have gone 
on to argue that the claims about the effects of titling are exaggerated given the 
scarcity of evidence (Reerink and van Gelder, 2010: 84). 
 
This paper examines the economic, social and human capital effects of a 
subsidised homeownership scheme in South Africa with a focus on Khayelitsha, 
a township in Cape Town. It aims to understand the benefits of both titling and 
homeownership in comparison to the possession of administrative occupancy 
rights. In this way, it adds to knowledge by going beyond the narrow economic 
focus to include social and human capital effects and adds to understanding of 





Although there is a rich literature on housing in South Africa, there are few 
empirical studies enquiring into the effects of property titling. These studies 
mainly focus on economic benefits and are less concerned with human and 
social capital effects. 
 
Franklin (2011) has shown that titling has positive labour market outcomes 
among beneficiaries. In assessing the impact of the South African government’s 
housing subsidy programme he examined the effects of the new housing policy 
on labour market participation, earnings and household income in 
neighbourhoods in Cape Town that received housing subsidies. He 
demonstrates that labour market participation, earnings and household income 
are higher among beneficiary households, particularly for young female adults. 
 
It is claimed that titling can lead to an increase in income through its effect on 
access to credit. In the South African context, studies find almost no evidence of 
this effect mainly because the beneficiaries of housing subsidies are wary of the 
risk involved in using their property as collateral (Kingwill et al., 2006: 53-65; 
Boudreaux, 2008; Lemanski, 2011). 
 
Boudreaux (2008) and Meintjes (2000) suggest that titling has a positive effect 
on wealth while Rust (2006) suggests a similar finding but further shows that 
home-based entrepreneurial activities do not result in more wealth. It is held 
that titling has a positive effect on home-based entrepreneurial investments 
which in turn increase wealth. Boudreaux (2008) demonstrates that some title-
holders use their homes as secure places of business, generating income that 
residents use to support their families. Meintjes (2000) finds that homeowners 




their homes with household durables. However, Rust (2006: 44-52) shows that 
property titles are not enough because they require a functioning secondary 
property market, sufficient housing stock, people’s ability to afford repayments 
on housing finance and mortgage lenders’ willingness to move downmarket. 
From this discussion, titling may lead to increased home-based entrepreneurial 
activities but these are found not to be meaningful enough to create long term 
substantive and sustained increases in wealth. 
 
Titling has also been shown to have a positive effect on housing improvements. 
Turner and Fichter (1972) and Abrams (1966) suggested that occupants in 
informal settlements have no incentive to invest in their houses because of 
tenure insecurity. Titling and upgrading may reduce this insecurity and result in 
various household investments. For example, title-holders in Langa, Cape Town 
were found to invest in improving their homes, which raised property values 
(Boudreaux, 2008). Also, home improvement projects provided entrepreneurial 
opportunities for a wide variety of local artisans. However, because 
Boudreaux’s study relied on qualitative evidence, it is deficient of evidence on 
the extent of improvements and percentage increase in property values. In 
addition, it has been shown elsewhere that untitled households may also make 
improvements which the study failed to acknowledge. 
 
Several qualitative studies explore low-income housing and emerging 
relationships in low-income neighbourhoods in South Africa (Lemanski, 2006; 
Seekings, 2008b; Harper and Seekings, 2010; Ross, 2010; 2011; Muyeba and 
Seekings, 2012). This literature suggests that as a result of obtaining ownership 
of new low-income housing, residents espouse values of respectability, decency, 
dignity and belonging as they forge their relationships (Lee, 2005; Ross, 2010). 
These values are in contrast to the dehumanising experiences that they 
experienced during apartheid. However, quantitative analysis of these effects is 
scarce. 
 
However, community-making efforts among subsidy beneficiaries are 
undermined by persistent segregation (Oldfield, 2004; Lemanski, 2006; 2011) 
although there is some tolerance as a result of contact in new mixed 
neighbourhoods (Muyeba and Seekings, 2011). Other factors that constrain 
community making include jealousy and gossip (Ross, 2010: 160-163), 
witchcraft (Ashforth, 2005), and violent crime and criminality (Centre for the 
Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2010). The literature further identifies 
that coping mechanisms such as kinship support are not as supportive as 
previously thought because residents are recognising fewer conditional 
obligations toward kin (Seekings, 2008a; Harper and Seekings, 2010). There is 
also evidence of privacy which constrains community making (Muyeba and 




individuals are moving between households and become members of multiple 
households at a time (Spiegel et al., 1996; Seekings, 2008a).  
 
 
3. The Context: Khayelitsha 
 
Khayelitsha (meaning ‘new home’ in isiXhosa) was a township planned in 1983 
by the apartheid state to accommodate Africans that were legally in Cape Town 
and squatting in formal African townships (Cook, 1992: 125). It became the 
apartheid government’s response to the severe shortage of housing for Africans 
in the Western Cape (Seekings et al., 1990: 8). Building of houses and formal 
occupation was completed by 1985 with ninety-nine years leasehold tenure 
allowed for Africans who were legally in Cape Town at the time. 
 
Shortly before in November 1984, the government announced that illegal 
African migrants in Cape Town would be allowed to build shacks on site-and-
service plots in Site C, Khayelitsha, near the current N2 highway (Cook, 1992: 
125). This meant a temporary administrative recognition of occupancy. The part 
of Khayelitsha known as Site C was first established as a transit camp for the 
transfer of illegal migrants to rural areas (Cook, 1992; Mdewu, 2004; Zonke, 
2006). Forty-two families who came from the nearby shack settlements of Old 
Crossroads were the first to be resettled there (Mdewu, 2004).  Soon after, 8,300 
squatter families occupied 4,150 site and service plots. One tap was provided 
for four sites and one bucket toilet for every two sites. However, adjacent land 
that had no services of any kind was also occupied and these shack settlements 
became permanent. 
 
Continued urbanisation that followed both the repeal of the pass laws in 1986 
and the removal of influx controls led to dense clusters of shacks. They were 
erected on un-serviced sites and on any available open space both in Site C and 
other areas of Khayelitsha. By mid-1989, an estimated 13 000 families were 
squatting on un-serviced sites. The population increased without the increase in 
serviced sites. In 1988, the population of Khayelitsha was approximately 189 
000. It increased to 305 323 in 1989 and was estimated to have stabilised 
around 450 000 in late 1990. Of the 450 000, 36 percent (162 000) lived in 
shacks on un-serviced sites in Site C, Site B, Town Two and other areas of 
Khayelitsha (Cook, 1992: 125-130). 
 
In 1994, the new post-apartheid state developed a targeted one-off subsidy in 
the form of a grant to low income households, which provided eligible 
households with ownership of a newly-built, fully-serviced one-bedroom house. 
Allocation procedures were as follows. Individuals first registered on the 




municipal housing office. The office then captured their information on the 
Housing Demand Database. A project plan was then drafted by the municipality 
for approval by the Provincial Government of the Western Cape (PGWC).  
 
Once the project plan was approved, the municipality applied the selection 
criteria. In order to be eligible, respondents were required to show proof by ID 
that they were South African citizens, have a household size of 4 or more, 
provide birth certificates of dependants, and provide a copy of the ID book of 
their spouse if married, or partner if in a partnership. The application forms 
were then processed through the Housing Subsidy System (HSS), an operational 
system which tracks housing subsidy applications and allocations on a national 
scale. To be allocated a subsidy, applicants had to prove using a payslip that 
they had a maximum monthly household income of R3 500 or less (Republic of 
South Africa, 1994). Joint spouses who earned R800 and below would receive a 
capital subsidy worth R15 000 and those who earned between R801 and R1 500 
would receive one worth R12 500. Following this, the municipality publicised 
the list of beneficiaries. Construction of the houses commenced after 
beneficiaries contributed R2 479 to the project – this was required in order for 
them to have an economic stake in their new asset (Tomlinson, 2006). Once 
houses were completed, from 1997 onwards, the project manager handed them 
over to beneficiaries under freehold tenure (Provincial Government of the 
Western Cape, 2013). 
 
Although housing allocation generally met targeted households, there were 
several problems with the process of allocation which has a bearing on 
empirical analysis. Firstly, the waiting list did not operate on a first come first 
served basis. There were many waiting lists which were drawn up during the 
apartheid years and some people were on multiple lists in different locations. 
Attempts by municipalities and the province to merge lists failed (Tissington et 
al., 2013: 25). Although the Cape Town Municipality kept a waiting list, they 
used it alongside a system based on allocation to communities in catchment 
areas of specific building projects. Housing subsidies were allocated according 
to quotas for each community under a specific housing project. Communities 
established project committees that were responsible for allocating houses to 
their members (Franklin, 2011: 10; Tissington et al., 2013: 26). Through this 
system, people of Khayelitsha were called to register during a given time period 
of up to two weeks at a time if they wished to apply for a house. It did not 
matter how long an individual had lived in the community – some applicants 
came from other communities during the registration period and from as far as 






. Meanwhile, others had received their subsidies through the housing 
waiting list, the allocation of which was chaotic and was further impeded by 
occurrences of fraud and corruption – some beneficiaries received more than 
one subsidy and some who had not been allocated subsidies invaded houses but 
were allowed to stay on by the state. (Franklin, 2011: 10; Tissington et al., 
2013: 26). 
 
Despite the problems, the case of Khayelitsha provides an opportunity for the 
investigation of the effects of real property rights (of both titling and 
homeownership) on beneficiaries relative to those with administrative 
recognition of occupancy. The existence of a group that benefitted and one that 
did not provides a treatment and a comparison group. Those who remained in 
shacks in Site C, Site B, Town One and Town Two are the comparison group 
while those who moved to serviced sites in Site B, Makhaza, Kuyasa and 
eventually moved into state-built houses are the treatment group. Furthermore, 
the allocation of subsidies was done in phases which ensured that at any one 
time, there were beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in Khayelitsha existing 
simultaneously. Many non-beneficiaries remain on the waiting list on serviced 





Data from the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS), which is an on-going panel 
study in Cape Town, was analysed to examine the effects described above. 
CAPS follows the lives of a large representative sample of young adults living 
in metropolitan Cape Town as they undergo multiple transitions from 
adolescence to adulthood. However, CAPS also administers household level 
questionnaires. The first wave commenced in 2002. There have been 4 
subsequent waves with the latest wave (wave 5) carried out in 2009 when the 
young adults were aged between 22 and 30. CAPS includes a range of aspects 
of adolescence including schooling, entry into the labour-market, housing, 
neighbourhood, sexual and reproductive health, and family and kin relations. 
The panel asks questions about whether the household head or anyone in the 
household received a government housing subsidy to acquire land or build the 
house. The original panel consisted of approximately 4,750 individuals. After 
attrition, the panel shrunk to less than 3,000 people by 2009. Respondents were 
aged between 14 and 22 years in 2002 and between ages 19 and 35 in 2009. 
Sampling involved three stages. Firstly, neighbourhoods were selected using 
                                           
1
 One of the respondents registered a week after coming from the Eastern Cape and received 
a housing subsidy six months later. Another used ID books of other family members in order 




probability proportional to size and were stratified according to population 
group
2
. 440 clusters of neighbourhoods roughly corresponding to the 1996 
Census enumerator areas were selected. Secondly, from each cluster, some 
households were selected. Thirdly, up to three young adults were selected from 
each household. Since CAPS covers all of Cape Town, a sub-sample consisting 




Table 1: Variable Descriptions 
 
Variable Name Variable Type Description 
Labour participation Ratio scale “How many hours do you work on your current job per 
day?” 
Per capita income Interval Scale Log of household income per capita from imputed per 
capita income variable  
Household durables Composite scale “Does anyone in your household own …?” (E.g. radio, 
television, microwave, refrigerator, car etc.) 
Physical health Ordinal scale “How good is your health?” 0=poor, 1=fair, 2=good, 
3=very good, 4=excellent 
Teenage pregnancy Dummy  “Have you ever been pregnant?” 1=pregnant, 
0=otherwise, restricted to females below age of 18 
years 
School dropouts Dummy  Average number of respondents who had not 




Dummy  “Did your household move in the past five years?” 
(wave 1)/ Have you moved since the last interview 








The dummy variable “freehold” was derived from the questions “Did anyone 
receive a government housing subsidy to buy land or build this residence?”, 
asked in wave 1 and wave 3, and “What is the main material for the walls of the 
                                           
2
 By population group, I mean the apartheid era reference to “race”. The terminology has 
remained in common use in post-apartheid South Africa. I will use this terminology where 
necessary in this paper purely for purposes of clarity. The population groups include “Black”, 




residence?”, asked in wave 3. The dummy allocates 1 to those who responded 
“no” in wave 1, “yes” in wave 3, and had responded “permanent building (brick 
block)” regarding the main materials for the walls of their residence in wave 3. 
The dummy assigns 0 to those who responded “no” to receiving a housing 
subsidy in both waves and had responded “traditional materials, temporary 
shack or permanent shack for wall materials” in both waves. In this way, I take 
advantage of the phased in allocation of housing subsidies to restrict the sample 
to individuals in the panel who had not yet received a subsidy in 2002 (wave 1) 
but received one between 2003 (wave 2) and 2004 (wave 3). In this way, 2002 
was the baseline because at that point in time, all the individuals selected had 
not yet received their housing subsidy. Table 1 above provides a description of 





Difference-in-differences (DID) estimation was used to assess the effect of a 
housing subsidy on the outcome variables. The models are of the form: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = β0 + β1(𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑)𝑖𝑡 + β2(𝑅𝐷𝑃_ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟)1  
+ β3(𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 ∗ 𝑅𝐷𝑃_ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 + β𝑘𝑖X𝑘𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖 
 
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is any one of the outcome variables for observation i at time t, 
treat_period is a dummy variable with the value of 1 for the post-treatment 
period and 0 for the pre-treatment period, RDP_homeowner is a dummy taking 
the value 1 if the individual is in the treatment group and 0 if they are in the 
control group, the coefficient of the interaction between treat_period and 
RDP_homeowner, β3, is the OLS difference-in-differences estimator, or the 
logistic regression odds ratio. The vector X𝑘𝑖 specifies the pre-treatment 
covariates, or controls. 
 
The DID coefficients were estimated for labour participation, per capita income, 
assets, physical health, and membership in associations using OLS regressions. 
The DID odds ratio was estimated for teenage pregnancies, stability and the 















6.1 Characteristics of RDP homeowners and shack-
dwellers  
 
Table 2 below shows that there are no significant differences in terms of 
demographics while some characteristics of the dwelling are significantly 
different in both periods, with beneficiaries scoring higher. The lack of 
demographic differences supports the use of shack-dwellers as my comparison 
group in the difference-in-differences estimation. 
 
 
Table 2. Characteristics of housing subsidy beneficiaries versus shack-
dwellers in 2002 and 2009 
 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 
At baseline both groups have an average age of 18 years with t(317) = -1.16. At 
endline, respondents in both groups are on average aged 24 years with t(225) =   
-0.13. At baseline, the proportion of males to females, 0.43 with t(328) = 0.10 
for both groups, shows no difference while at endline, the proportion of males 
in the treatment group, 0.45, is slightly more than that in the comparison group, 
0.42, but with no statistically significant difference, t(225) = -0.50. However, in 
both groups and both periods, we see that there are fewer males than females in 
the sample. I find that on average, both groups have the same number of years 
of education: at baseline, beneficiaries score an average of 8.7 years while 
shack-dwellers have 8.4 years, t(273) = -1.14; at endline, both groups have an 
 
Wave 1 (2002) Wave 5 (2009) 
Control Treatment  Control Treatment  
Variable (N=219) (N=111) t (N=187) (N=102) t 
Age 17.7 18.0 -1.16 24.5 24.6 -0.13 
Male 0.43 0.43 -0.10 0.42 0.45 -0.50 
Education 8.44 8.72 -1.14 10.03 10.26 -0.92 
Marital status 0 0 0.72 0.07 0.10 -0.84 
Child 0.22 0.27 -0.69 0.32 0.31 0.21 
Household size 5.35 5.66 -1.43 5.52 6.06 -1.62 
Employment 0.10 0.12 -0.63 0.48 0.43 0.61 
Rooms 3.7 3.7 -0.14 3.6 4.3 -3.63*** 
Piped water 0.61 0.94 -6.60*** 0.67 0.93 -5.10*** 




average of 10 years with t(271) = -0.92 showing no significant difference 
between them. There are almost no married respondents at baseline: the 
proportion of married respondents being 0 for both groups, with t(314) = 0.72; 
at endline, there seem to be more married respondents among beneficiaries, 
0.10, than among non-beneficiaries, 0.07, although the difference is not 
statistically significant, t(225) = -0.84. Similarly, the proportion of respondents 
with children at both baseline and endline did not differ between the two 
groups. At baseline, the proportion for beneficiaries is 0.27 while that for shack-
dwellers is 0.22, t(317) = -0.69. At endline, we see an increase to 0.31 and 0.32 
for beneficiaries and shack-dwellers respectively, t(224) = 0.21. It appears that 
the rate of increase in the proportion of respondents with children was faster 
among shack-dwellers than among beneficiaries over the same period. In terms 
of household size, both groups have an average of 5 members at baseline, t(319) 
= -1.43, while at endline beneficiaries have almost significantly more members 
with an average of 6.0 while shack-dwellers have 5.5 members, t(286) = -1.62. 
However, there is no statistically significant difference. Finally, there are no 
differences in the proportion of employed respondents; few respondents are 
employed at baseline, with beneficiaries scoring 0.10 and shack-dwellers 0.12, 
t(317) = -0.62. The proportions rise to almost half at endline with beneficiaries 
scoring 0.43 and shack-dwellers 0.48 but with no statistically significant 
difference, t(225) = 0.61. 
 
There are differences in the characteristics of the dwelling in both periods, 
except for number of rooms in which there are no differences at baseline t(328) 
= -0.14. The significant differences are in the household’s most often used 
source of drinking water and the most often used kind of toilet for the residence. 
In this case, RDP homeowners have better sanitation facilities than shack-
dwellers at both baseline and endline. Among beneficiaries, a proportion of 0.94 
have access to piped water versus 0.61 among non-beneficiaries, t(328) = -6.60 
at baseline, and 0.93 versus 0.67 respectively, t(286) = -5.10 at endline. At 
baseline, the proportion of beneficiaries with access to a flush toilet is 0.93 
versus 0.75 among non-beneficiaries, t(325) = -4.05, and 0.93 versus 0.70 
respectively, t(286) = -4.66 at endline. This reveals that more beneficiary 
households lived on serviced sites than non-beneficiary households prior to 
treatment. It may also indicate that the roll-out of housing subsidies prioritised 
households living on serviced sites.  
 
Table 3 reports that there are no significant differences in the number of hours 
worked on the current job, that beneficiaries are likely to report lower income, 
more durables, poorer physical health, and a higher proportion of teenage 
pregnancies. There are no significant differences in proportion of school 
dropouts, stability of tenure and membership in voluntary associations. At 




to report less per capita income and more assets. Physical health, teenage 
pregnancies, proportion of school dropouts, and stability are the same. There is 
significantly less memberships in voluntary associations among beneficiaries. 
 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics on various outcome variables: Beneficiaries 
versus shack-dwellers in 2002 and 2009 
 
 
Wave 1 (2002) Wave 5 (2009) 
Control Treatment  Control Treatment  
Variable (N=219) (N=111) t (N=187) (N=102) t 
Labour  0.77 1.00 -0.74 4.02 3.41 1.03 
Income 5.56 5.24 3.47*** 6.11 5.88 1.97** 
Durables 3.89 4.77 3.24*** 6.01 6.63 -2.08** 
Health 4.13 3.78 2.88*** 3.81 3.94 -0.85 
Pregnant 0.06 0.40 2.97*** 0.28 0.31 -0.32 
Dropout 0.71 0.78 -0.78 0.69 0.73 -0.77 
Stability 0.86 0.91 -1.34 0.90 0.93 -0.79 
Memberships 1.50 1.50 0.06 0.95 0.64 2.82*** 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 
On the basis of these mean scores and mean differences, we cannot ascertain 
that the government housing subsidy was responsible for the observed 
differences, particularly during the post-treatment period. This is because from 
the post-treatment mean differences, exogenous factors that may have affected 
the parameters of interest during the course of time are not controlled for. 
Constant factors in terms of demographics are, however, controlled for since it 
is the same individuals observed at different points in time. To control for 
exogenous factors, difference-in-differences estimation is employed. 
 
 
6.2 Effects of the housing subsidy  
 
This section reports the difference-in-differences estimates for the outcome 
variables. It shows that the housing subsidy has the effect of improving self-
reported health and increasing teenage pregnancies among beneficiaries but has 
no effect on the other hypothesised outcome measures. Tables 4 and 5 below 






Table 4. Effects of the Housing Subsidy on labour participation, household per capita income, household 
durables, physical health, and membership in voluntary associations: Difference-In-Differences Estimation 
(Multivariate OLS Regression) 
 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses. Only demographic and significant variables are controlled for in each model. Regression of hours controls for sex, 
marital status, children, education, household size and physical health. Regression of per capita income controls for age, sex, marital status, children, 
education, hours of labour and household size. Regression of household durables controls for age, sex, marital status, children, education, employment status 
and household size. Regression of physical health controls for age, sex, marital status, education, hours of labour and household size. Regression of 
membership in associations controls for age, household size, education, civic duties and political awareness. Number of observation is a combined total of the 
baseline and endline observations. 
 (1) 
Hours worked 
 per day 
(2) 
Per capita household 
income (log) 
(3) 
Number of household 
durables owned 
(4) 



























RDP homeowners 3.24 0.62 6.0 6.6 0.21 0.35 2.99 3.04 0.09 -0.02 
 (1.85) (1.86) (0.41) (0.41) (0.08) (0.08) (0.52) (0.52) (0.10) (0.10) 
Shack-dwellers 3.16 0.06 6.2 6.64 0.16 0.32 3.35 2.89 0.12 0.04 
 (1.84) (1.83) (0.40) (0.40) (0.08) (0.08) (0.51) (0.51) (0.09) (0.09) 
Difference 0.08 0.68 0.22* 0.05 0.06** 0.03 0.35** 0.14 -0.03 -0.06** 




















  0.209  0.244  0.284  0.057  0.123 




As Table 4 reports, the marginal effect on physical health estimated by the 
coefficient of the interaction term between RDP homeowner and treatment 
period is significant at 0.50 controlling for demographic and other explanatory 
factors. The DID estimator represents the estimated improvement in health 
attributed to being a beneficiary of a housing subsidy. This coefficient means 
that a housing subsidy increases physical health by 0.5 on a scale of 1 to 5 with 
1 being poor and 5 being excellent. The housing subsidy has had an impact of 
improving self-reported health by 10 percent among the beneficiaries in the 
data. I therefore reject the null hypothesis of no association between (self-
reported) health and receiving a housing subsidy.  
 
 
Table 5. Effects of the housing subsidy on teen pregnancy, proportion of 
school dropouts and stability: Difference-in-Differences estimation 











Treatment period 25.79*** 0.53 4.01*** 
 (30.53) (0.23) (2.05) 
RDP homeowner 49.25*** 1.51 2.05 
 (65.85) (0.94) (1.16) 
Period*homeowner 0.02*** 0.77 1.42 
 (0.03) (0.55) (1.75) 
Pseudo R
2
 0.186 0.079 0.176 
Observations 116 273 409 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Only demographic and theoretically important variables 
controlled for. Regression of teenage pregnancies controls include age, marital status, education and 
per capita income. Regression of school dropouts controls include age, sex, marital status, children, 
household size, per capita income and mother’s education. Controls for stability include age, sex, 
marital status, children, household size, education per capita income, hours of labour and 
memberships. Number of observation is a combined total of the baseline and endline observations. 
 
 
There is no effect of the housing subsidy on the number of labour hours worked. 
The marginal effect implied by the estimated coefficient on the interaction term 
between RDP homeowner and treatment period is 0.60 hours. This coefficient 
corresponds to an increase in the number of hours of labour. However, the 
estimate is not statistically significant. This means that both housing subsidy 
beneficiaries and shack dwellers work for a similar number of hours per day. I 
thus fail to reject the null hypothesis. Similarly, there is no effect of a housing 
subsidy on household per capita income. The difference-in-differences estimate 




capita income. However, this was not statistically significant. Therefore, I fail to 
reject the null hypothesis. Likewise, there is no effect on the number of 
household durables. The estimated treatment effect is -0.02 implying a 
reduction in the number of household items. This effect is not statistically 
significant. I therefore fail to reject the null hypothesis of no association. I find 
no effect on the proportion of school dropouts. The marginal effect reported in 
the DID estimate is 0.77 but this is not statistically significant. I fail to reject the 
null hypothesis. Finally, with regard to membership in voluntary associations, 
there is no effect: the estimated DID coefficient is -0.03 representing a 
reduction in memberships but this is not statistically significant. I thus fail to 
reject the null hypothesis. 
 
In Table 5 above, the DID estimates are reported for the hypothesis that 
homeownership leads to socially desirable youth behaviour and stability using 
basic logistic regression. With regard to teenage pregnancies, I find that teenage 
girls in households of beneficiaries have higher odds of being pregnant than 
teenage girls who are shack-dwellers. The DID estimates that the odds of being 
pregnant for a teenager in beneficiary households are 0.02 times higher than the 
odds are for a teenage girl belonging to a household of shack-dwellers, when 
controlling for other factors (0.11 without controls). Although at baseline 
teenage girls from beneficiary households have a significantly higher 
proportion, it reduces after treatment while that of shack-dwellers rises during 
the same period. Nevertheless, the proportion remains higher. I therefore reject 
the null hypothesis of no association but find that the direction of association is 
opposite to what was expected. This means that being a beneficiary of a housing 
subsidy is associated with a marginally larger proportion of teenage girls who 
become pregnant. I also report no effect on stability, with the odds ratio being 





The paper has examined the effects of real property rights in the Southern 
African context, in which empirical studies are limited. It has examined 
economic, human and social capital effects of the subsidised low-income 
housing scheme in South Africa, with a focus on Khayelitsha in Cape Town. 
The study goes beyond common practice by examining effects of titling on 
human and social capital measures of poverty, which have hitherto remained 
largely understudied in the literature on titling.  
 
Titling did not translate into positive effects on labour market participation in 
terms of hours of labour. This finding is inconsistent with the theory. It is not 




towards work is not effective. Rather, in an economy with high unemployment 
averaging 24 percent in 2010 (StatsSA, 2010) and decreasing market demand 
for unskilled labour, it may not be realistic to expect that an increase in supply 
of unskilled labour would lead to an increase in the number of hours worked, or 
let alone to an increase in employment status. It may be that the pool of the 
unemployed increases but people cannot find work even though they have the 
time.  
 
In an extensive study using detailed nationally representative surveys, Banerjee 
et al. (2008) investigated why so many South Africans were unemployed. They 
found that large increases in labour supply (especially among women) have not 
been matched by increase in demand for labour (2008: 716). This mismatch is 
especially acute for unskilled labour, with declining demand for unskilled 
labour in mining and agricultural sectors. Unemployment has persisted in part 
because as demand for labour has been falling, it has not been accompanied by 
a fall in wages large enough to clear the labour market (Banerjee et al., 2008: 
716-717). In this kind of labour market, increases in labour market participation 
within titled households (or resulting from any other intervention) would have 
little or no effect on employment and hence income. In the broader literature, 
this finding is similar to that of Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010), but differs 
from that of Field (2003) who found that titling in Peru leads to an increase in 
labour participation. The mechanism and economic context in Field’s study are 
different. In Field’s case, titled households had significantly low tenure security 
at baseline that they had to have an adult member present at home at all times. 
In my study, beneficiaries already had considerable tenure security because they 
had been allocated plots and were provided with services before baseline. 
Arguably, in Field’s study the Peruvian economy could absorb an increase in 
labour supply. Perhaps further research can be done in contexts where there is 
demand for unskilled labour coupled with low unemployment. 
 
No evidence is found supporting the hypothesis that titling may result in 
increased household per capita income. This finding is also inconsistent with 
theory. Because there is no evidence of labour market participation, which is the 
main mechanism through which the association would occur, it follows 
logically that there is no effect on income. Other mechanisms such as 
investments in home businesses and increased home employment for members 
of the household have not been examined because the data is deficient of these 
variables. Despite the lack of data, it may be the case that these mechanisms do 
not operate in the South African context. This would not be surprising because 
previous studies find similar evidence. Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010), for 
example, found no effect of titling on income in Buenos Aires. Similarly, 
Franklin (2011) found no association between the housing subsidy and income 




significant impacts on income for female beneficiaries. These female 
beneficiaries were able to reallocate their time from home to the labour market. 
However, these conclusions differ from the findings of Moura et al. (2011), 
Field and Torero (2006) and Field (2003) in which an increase in income was 
preceded by an increase in labour market participation, which may not have 
occurred in the case at hand. 
 
Additionally, titling did not result in increases in wealth. Although beneficiaries 
of housing subsidies have significantly more household items, this difference 
cannot be attributed to the housing subsidy. Perhaps beneficiaries already had 
enough space such that they had no obligation to fill their home with household 
items, as Meintjes (2000) expected.  
 
However, a modest but positive effect of the government housing subsidy on 
physical health is evident among beneficiaries. We should expect that moving 
shack-dwellers to houses under the housing subsidy would improve their self-
reported health by 10 percent. Although this subjective measure is the best 
measure available in the data, it is not deficient of limitations. It is not known 
how much of it may reflect the mood of the respondent on the day or time of the 
interview. It is also not clear whether this effect on health is long-or short-term. 
Furthermore, there is no differentiation between the effects on chronic diseases 
and short-term illnesses. Neither is there differentiation between child health 
and adult health. The effect estimated is for general self-reported health status, 
which has not been previously assessed. The mechanism seems to be that the 
improvement in housing quality and environment, as shown by the figures on 
access to piped water and toilets, actually translates into better health. Shacks in 
Khayelitsha and other townships are susceptible to fire, flooding and dust; 
sources of respiratory and waterborne diseases. Once these are improved, health 
status improves. Previous studies elsewhere have found positive effects of 
titling albeit on children. Positive effects of titling on short-term health (weight-
for-height) among children but not long-term (height-for-age) have been found 
in Argentina (Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2004; Vogl, 2007). In Peru however, 
the improvement raises the risk of obesity among children (Vogl, 2007). Among 
adults, titled households have a lower occurrence of some chronic diseases 
although the actual mechanism through which this occurs is not evident 
(Gandelman, 2010). Future studies should consider examining the effects of 
titling on physical health among adults using a more objective measure such as 
actual physical medical tests.  
 
Furthermore, titling does not reduce anti-social behaviour in terms of teenage 
pregnancies and school dropout rates. Counter-intuitively, having a housing 
subsidy resulted in an increase in teenage pregnancies. Parents may not allocate 




have the financial resources to allocate in the first place. Also, with low levels 
of education, they may not have the kind of cultural capital to transmit to their 
children. In addition, a house may provide the privacy that is lacking in shacks 
for teenagers to engage in sexually risky behaviour. The shacks may provide a 
deterrent for teenagers since the shacks are very close together, rooms are small 
and the wall materials thin and unstable. In contradiction, elsewhere Galiani and 
Schargrodsky (2004) found lower teenage pregnancies among untitled 
households. Caution must also be exercised in interpreting this result. The 
sample size at baseline was very small and this may have had an influence as 
the sample size grew larger over each wave. Larger sample sizes at baseline 
may help improve representativeness and generalisability.  
 
The evidence also fails to support the hypothesis that the housing subsidy 
reduces the proportion of school dropouts. In fact, the proportion of school 
dropouts was very high for both groups with only 30 percent of those above 18 
having completed high school. Similarly, there may not be as many resources to 
allocate to education considering that the respondents belong to poor 
households, some of which depend entirely on government grants to survive. 
Some authors have shown that in some contexts, titling favours home 
investments by holders rather than investments in human capital as indicated by 
education and health (Gandelman, 2011). This means that even with scarce 
resources, education may not get as large a share of investment as we have 
hitherto thought. Future studies should therefore look into the effects of titling 
on the allocation of resources in the household. 
 
Finally, no effect on neighbourhood stability is found as a result of having a 
housing subsidy. In the first place, the neighbourhoods were highly stable with 
only 10 percent of the respondents reporting a move in the previous 4 to 5 years 
before the baseline and endline surveys. It is possible that shack-dwellers did 
not move in anticipation of obtaining a housing subsidy. It is also possible that 
the reported movements out of the neighbourhoods obscure moves that occur 
when a household sells the house and moves into a backyard shack within the 
same neighbourhood; these neighbourhoods are in a high state of flux 
(Seekings, 2008). Further studies are necessary to build knowledge in this area. 
For example, why is there a high state of flux within the neighbourhood but not 
between neighbourhoods? Another question that needs to be answered 
particularly in the context of South Africa is how long do beneficiaries live in 
their houses following obtaining of a housing subsidy, and which beneficiaries 
are likely to live in the house for the longest period? For example, many of the 
beneficiaries in Cape Town who originate from the Eastern Cape do not 
consider Cape Town as their home. In fact, they look forward to their return. 
Are other tenure options more cost-effective in this regard? Such questions need 






There is limited empirical research regarding the effects of titling in Southern 
Africa. This paper examined the effects of titling and slum upgrading in this 
part of the developing world by evaluating the economic, social and human 
capital effects of subsidised housing in Khayelitsha, a township in Cape Town, 
South Africa. The study was undertaken with a view to understanding the 
benefits of real property rights and ownership of a capital asset among 
beneficiaries of low income households. As other studies have shown, this 
analysis revealed the methodological challenges in studying the effects of 
titling. Out of 8 measures, the housing subsidy improves self-reported health 
status by 10 percent and increases the proportion of teenage pregnancies while 
having no effect on six measures; the actual effects were smaller and fewer than 
expected. Titling was not associated with improvements in most of the measures 
of poverty reduction, supporting the argument that the benefits of titling may be 
exaggerated if researchers focus on selected variables rather than a broader set 
of measures. The positive effect on physical health is small and can more 
appropriately be attributed to a better living environment and improved housing 
quality, rather than to stronger tenure rights. The effect of increased teenage 
pregnancies is counterintuitive and inconsistent with studies in different 
contexts. Substantively, it is likely that poverty in Cape Town is driven so 
strongly by factors such as unemployment that real property rights make little 
overall difference to poverty. The study shows that the effects of titling extend 
beyond economic effects to human capital effects, which are understudied in the 
literature. Further analysis of this effect is necessary, thus, scholars need to go 
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